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ABSTRACT
Both governments and intemational donors have long used farmer associations as
a way of promoting rural development and directing benefits to the rural poor in
developing countries. Although this remains still as a popular policy, the literature
stresses that farmer associations often do not work well. The majority of this literature
tends to emphasize this fact rather than analyzing situations in which this policy has been
successful. This thesis, therefore, focuses not on the problems of farmer associations, but
on what, how, and why a set of three small farmer associations in the state of Ceara in
Northeast Brazil did well. Located in the poorest region of the country, all these farmer
associations received major funding from government programs. But in contrast to what
happens in Ceard and elsewhere, the poor members in the three associations discussed
dominated in decision-making. The poor farmers received significant benefits in the form
of services, and the associations were able to recover part of the costs of the services they
provided. In addition, one association was successful in agricultural production.
The analysis of this case study concludes providing lessons for agricultural policy,
and for program design and implementation.
Thesis supervisor: Judith Tendler
Professor of Political Economy
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Most of the agricultural and rural development literature stresses the problems
of farmer associations' and the limited benefits that they provide to the smaller
farmers. A small group of large farmers often dominate the associations and benefit
most from association services like credit and extension services (Attwood 1987, Fox
& HernAndez 1989, Lele 1981, Peek 1988, Peterson 1982). Financial problems often
plague farmer associations due to frequent mismanagement (Tendler 1983 & 1984)
and to the difficulty of controlling "free riders" who receive benefits without
contributing to the costs of providing them (Ostrom 1990). These obstacles are so
serious that many policy-makers in developing countries challenge the idea of
promoting farmer associations as an instrument for rural development and the
alleviation of rural poverty. Is it possible for farmer associations to overcome the
above-mentioned problems and benefit the poorest members? Can they be appropriate
instruments of poverty alleviation policies? This thesis will help answer these
questions by focusing on the lessons provided by the accomplishments of three small
farmer associations in the state of Ceard in Northeast Brazil, one of the poorest
regions in the world. These associations have succeeded in many ways.
First, these associations provide significant benefits to their poorer members,
I use the term fanner association to define organizations in which their members are agricultural
producers who join to pursue objectives of collective interest. These organizations may have different
objectives, from selling their individual crops to producing collectively. They may undertake different tasks,
from interest group representation to marketing and provision of services to members and non-members.
They may have different legal status, ranging from informal groups to registered cooperatives.
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such as rental services of machinery too expensive for them to purchase, and credit for
working capital in the periods in which the poorer members have no other income.
This is unusual because, elsewhere, farmer associations' services often benefit the
larger members rather than the small ones (Attwood & Baviskar 1987, Fox &
Hemindez 1989, Tendler 1983 & 1984). Most importantly, the poorer farmers do not
perceive these services as favors from the cooperatives' leaders and managers--as it
happens elsewhere in Northeast Brazil--but as their rights as co-op members.
Second, the leadership of these associations comprises the poorer farmers. This
contradicts what happens in most farmer associations elsewhere, which are usually
controlled by the richer members (Attwood 1987, Fox & Hernndez 1989, Lele 1981,
Peek 1988, Peterson 1982, Tendler 1983 & 1984). Most interestingly, the smaller
farmers took over the control of their associations in the middle 1980s after a struggle
with entrenched leadership from the large farmers. This is uncommon in Northeast
Brazil and elsewhere because the poor members are often weak and unable to organize
(Korten 1980). In addition, the change in the associations' leadership relates to an
educational component of a government program. This is also interesting because
educational programs often fail for facing opposition from the rural elites (Tendler
1982 & 1991).
Third, the three associations have partially recovered the cost of some of their
services by charging fees for specific tasks. This is striking because cost recovery is a
typical problem with all small farmer associations for two reasons: a) most of their
members are too poor to pay, and b) politicians also find it hard to insist on cost
recovery of services provided by government agencies (e.g. extension services)
because they do not want to alienate their vote-ranks. Indeed, most Ceard government
officials oppose charging small farmers for the services provided by their agencies.
Fourth, the most successful association examined is an agrarian reform
settlement. This is unusual for three reasons: a) most of the literature about agrarian
reforms --as well as the common wisdom in Brazil-- stresses that agrarian reforms
often fail2 ; b) members of the agrarian reform studied here raise livestock, an
enterprise in which they had no previous experience and which is often associated in
the literature with large landholdings (CEPA 1986); c) the settlers of the agrarian
reform settlement have succeeded in building a program from scratch. This
contradicts most of the literature, which suggests that programs should build on what
peasants already know (Korten 1980, Rao and Caballero 1990).
The associations in this study have managed to succeed in many tasks despite
suffering from some of the same problems that the literature on collective action
attributes to failure among these associations. Some of them used to be dominated by
the large farmers. All of them have had to solve conflicts with non-collaborative
members. Some suffer from management problems and serious financial deficit. All
of them have suffered from an adverse environment--high inflation, adverse climatic
conditions, and lack of support from local governments. Although these problems are
2 Kutcher and Scandizzo (1981) represent a remarkable exception in this literature because they argue
strongly for agrarian reform in Northeast Brazil from a neoclassical economics framework. Using a linear
programming model based on extensive field research, they conclude that agrarian reform would increase
substantially employment and agricultural production, also benefiting consumers through lower prices of
agricultural products.
important, I focus on what these three associations did well, trying to explain the
conditions and circumstances under which they were successful providing benefits to
their poor members--something that the literature rarely focuses on. The questions I
ask in the thesis are: Why were small farmers motivated and able to take over the
control of their cooperatives if poor members are often considered to be weak and
unable to organize? How have small farmers built cooperatives that perform many
tasks well, even better than when the elites dominated them? How have they
recovered the costs of some of the services they provide? If most of the literature
about collective action and the general wisdom in Brazil state that agrarian reform
does not work well, why was the agrarian reform case in this study a successful one?
How did its members of the agrarian reform settlement successfully raise livestock
given that they had no previous experience with livestock? How did this agrarian
reform settlement build its success from scratch? My aim is to generate lessons for
agricultural policy, program design, and implementation. These lessons should also
offer insights into the role that cooperatives and associations can play in poverty
alleviation programs.
This study is organized in six parts. In this first chapter, I summarize the
purpose and the organization of the study and outline the problem, research questions,
and methodology. In Chapter 2, I present a brief overview of Ceard's agricultural
sector and describe the three associations studied here. In Chapter 3, I concentrate on
unexpected findings in agricultural production carried out by members of the farmer
associations. Chapter 4 addresses the issue of extension services provision, comparing
the effectiveness of the extension services carried out by the state government agency
on one hand, and by the two of the associations on the other hand. Chapter 5 presents
findings on the factors that made it possible for poor peasants to control their
associations, either taking them over from the large farmers who dominated them, or
mobilizing to claim for the land and developing a powerful organization. In the last
chapter I present the conclusions of the study.
Methodology
This thesis is based on field research in the state of CearA, Brazil, carried out
in the three months between June and September of 1992. During that period, I
conducted 112 interviews. In the first month I interviewed officials and field workers
in state government agencies in Fortaleza (CearA's capital city), professors at the
Federal University of Ceard, and state-level leaders of cooperatives and of the agrarian
reform movement. I spent the following two months interviewing peasant members,
and leaders of the three associations (listed below). I also interviewed field workers,
especially extension agents from the cooperatives and the government agency
delivering extension services. In addition, I interviewed officials of local governments
and state agencies in the munictpios3 where my three cases were located: Senador
Pompeu, Piquet Carneiro, and Monsenhor Tabosa. The interviews followed a flexible
'There are three levels of government in Brazil: federal, state, and municipio. A munictpio corresponds
roughly to the American county, but differs in that it contains one central township and an outlying and
sometimes large rural area. The munictpio is governed by an elected "prefeito" (mayor) and about a dozen
councilmen called "vereadores". The total number of munictpios in Brazil reaches 4,000, distributed among
23 states and three territories. Ceard has 178 munictpios.
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questionnaire with emphasis on open-ended questions. Questions varied with the
interview, with the objective being to understand what activities worked better and
why. These interviews helped me to select successful cases and to define the political,
social, and economic environment of farmer associations in Ceard.
I chose the cases based on the success stories I collected during my first month
of interviewing. Defining success was not an easy task. First, it is a relative concept.
For example, financial performance represents an important measure of success, but in
the adverse climatic and economic conditions of Ceard most of the associations have
not shown a good financial performance. Indeed, the fact that small fanner
associations were able to survive may be considered in itself an achievement. Second,
from a policy perspective some relevant aspects--such as the participation of the small
farmers in the associations' leadership and the degree to which the associations target
benefits to their poorer members--are difficult to measure through quantitative
indicators.
As a result of the problems with financial and other quantitative indicators, I
identified the successful cases based on qualitative indicators. Specifically, the
successful associations in this study shared the following characteristics:
a) They were dominated by the poorer farmers rather than by the large ones;
b) They provided significant benefits to their poor members;
c) They developed innovative arrangements for internal decision-making
and/or for dealing with government agencies that provided them with services;
d) They performed very well one or more production or organizational tasks;
e) They implemented organizational arrangements that allowed them to
recover part of the costs of some services, even though they highly depended
on subsidized credit from the public sector and their financial performance was
not always good.
The cases I selected include two cooperatives of individual farmers (the
Agricultural Cooperative of Senador Pompeu COSENA, and the Agricultural
Cooperative of Piquet Carneiro COAPEC), and one agrarian reform settlement (the
Production Cooperative of Santana) in which members collectively own and operate
the means of production. The reasons for including the agrarian reform case was that
it gave the opportunity to address the implications of different size farms, products,
and work organization. At the same time, the three cases were representative of the
situations that most small farmers face in Cear. By comparing the paths they
followed, I aim to generate some lessons for agricultural policy and for the design of
rural development programs.
CHAPTER 2
THE CAST OF CHARACTERS
In this chapter, I describe the three associations included in my study, first
situating them within the economic and agricultural policy context of Ceard. Most of
the points presented in this chapter are more fully developed in other chapters.
The Agricultural Sector of Ceara
With 146,817 square kilometers, Ceard is one of the largest states in terms of
area in Northeast Brazil. With a population of six million, it is also one of the
poorest. Ceard's per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) reached US $1,182 in
1991, 87% of that of the Northeast and 43% of that of Brazil (IPLANCE 1991 &
1992). The life expectancy of the population is six years less the nation's as a whole
(59 compared with a national average of 65). The infant mortality rate of 65 (per
1,000 live births) is higher than Brazil's 57 (World Bank 1992).
Agriculture is still important in Ceard's economic and social structure. 37% of
the state's population and 33% of the labor force live in rural areas. Most of this
population is extremely poor, with 80% of the labor force earning less than the
minimum wage (IBGE 1989). Rural poverty in Ceard stems from three major inter-
related problems: recurrent droughts, low agricultural productivity, and a highly
unequal distribution of land. Every seven years, droughts affect most of the rural
Ceard causing the out-migration of thousands of people to Fortaleza and cities in the
more developed south and southeast of Brazil. In part because of the droughts,
agricultural productivity remains low. The Gross Agricultural Product comprises only
14% of the state's GDP (IBGE 1991, IPLANCE 1992). During the drought periods,
agricultural production falls dramatically, requiring the federal and state government to
intervene regularly with emergency programs to provide food, water, and employment
for the rural population.
Low agricultural productivity in the state also reflects Ceard's highly
concentrated land distribution. Although 63% of the farms are less than 10 hectares,
they have only 6% of the total land area; 39% of the farmers are sharecroppers or
squatters who cultivate crops mainly for their own subsistence and live in extremely
poor conditions (CEPA 1986, IPLANCE 1992). The sharecroppers grow cotton along
with subsistence crops (especially corn and beans) and give the landowner 30 to 50%
share of the cotton production. The landowner raises livestock and uses the stubble
left in cotton fields to feed the cattle after the harvest." Cotton and livestock, jointly
produced in the sharecropping system, have been the most important products in
CearA's economy. These small and poor farmers often lack access to credit and new
technologies, and are unable to sell their products at a good price (CEPA 1986). Most
of the large farmers in the region are not interested in increasing productivity because
they own large areas of land and can make up for low productivity by the low inputs
costs (and risks) of raising beef cattle exclusively on natural pastures (CEPA 1986).
4 For an excellent ethnogmphic study of the sharecropping system in Ceard, see Allen Johnson (1971).
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Rural Development Programs and Farmer Associations in Ceara
Widespread rural poverty has led to the implementation of many policies and
federal and state programs. Most of these policies and programs have paid special
attention to the promotion of farmer associations. While these policies and programs
assumed that farmer associations would benefit the small farmers, it was the large
farmers who created and benefitted most from the first rural cooperatives in the late
1960s (CEPA 1986). At this time, the federal government started to provide rural
cooperatives with subsidized credit and favorable tax treatment. All these co-ops
worked around marketing cotton produced by their members. Two more recent
programs strongly promoted small farmer associations in Ceard. These are:
1) The agrarian reform program, which started in 1987 and was implemented by a
federal agency, the National Institute of Colonization and Agrarian Reform (Instituto
Nacional de Colonizagdo e Reforma Agrdria, INCRA). INCRA expropriated large
landholdings in Ceard and elsewhere in Brazil and supported the creation of
settlements through credit and technical assistance. These settlements have often
undertaken collective production, and settlers have formed associations and
cooperatives in order to facilitate relationships with banks and other institutions.
2) The Program for the Support of Small Farmers (Programa de Apoio ao
Pequeno Produtor, PAPP).5 The PAPP program started in 1985 as part of a rural
s The PAPP program was a continuation of another agricultural and rural development program, the
Development Program for Integrated Areas of the Northeast (Programa de Desenvolvimento de Areas
Integradas do Nordeste, POLONORDESTE), which had started in 1974 and was also co-funded by the
World Bank. POLONORDESTE included much the same components of PAPP, but the latter differed
significantly in the implementation, providing a more important role to farmer associations. For a review
of POLONORDESTE and other rural development programs, see World Bank (1983).
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development program co-funded by the federal government and the World Bank. It
provided funding for agricultural research and technical assistance, agricultural
machinery and processing facilities for small farmer associations, and agricultural
credit for working capital. The program used to be coordinated by the State
Commission of Agricultural Planning (Comissdo Estadual de Planejamento Agricola,
CEPA). After CEPA was abolished, the program has been coordinated by a special
unit called PAPP in the State of Ceari Secretariat of Planning (Secretaria de
Planejamento do Estado do Ceard, SEPLAN). The coordinating unit contracted with
other state agencies the implementation of the program tasks. After program
evaluations stressed that some tasks like agricultural extension and credit were not
working well, PAPP began to decentralize the implementation of these tasks in 1987,
by funding farmer associations to undertake these tasks instead of government
agencies.
Critics of these programs are often quick to point out that most of the funding
that they provide to small farmer associations comprise grants and heavily subsidized
credit. Thus, the cost of these programs is so high that it would be impossible to
extend the programs on a large scale. Second, their impacts on rural organizations are
often limited. The associations often become dependent on subsidized funds to
survive. After high expenditures on technical assistance, most co-ops' members often
continue to apply traditional technologies. These criticisms often suggest that the
focus of policy-makers should be on macroeconomic and agricultural policies rather
than on these programs.
The three associations that are a focus of this study (and are described below)
are all related to the above-mentioned programs.
Three Farmer Associations
The farmer associations examined here include:
1) The Agricultural Cooperative of Senador Pompeu (Cooperativa Agropecudria
de Senador Pompeu COSENA), located in the munictpio of Senador Pompeu,
2) The Agricultural Cooperative of Piquet Cameiro (Cooperativa Agropecudria de
Piquet Carneiro COAPEC), located in the munictpio of Piquet Cameiro, and
3) The Production Cooperative of Santana (Cooperativa de Producdo do
Asentamento Santana), an agrarian reform settlement located in the municipio
of Monsenhor Tabosa.
All three associations share a number of important similarities (see Table 1 for
a summary):
1) First, they are all located in the semiarid zone of Cearf, between 200 and 250
miles from Fortaleza, Ceard's capital city. All three are located in poor,
predominantly rural munictpios that are dependent on agricultural production (cotton,
beans, and corn) (CEPA 1988a & 1988b, IPLANCE 1992). Soils are poor and the
drought resistant (xerophilus) vegetation that is predominant in the semiarid has an
extremely low productivity for grazing.
2) Second, all three associations have received large amounts of state support
through grants, subsidized credit, and technical assistance. The PAPP program has
provided COSENA and COAPEC with support since 1987 (nine and 17 years after
COSENA's and COAPEC's creation respectively). It gave them grants for their
extension services, agricultural machinery, small construction projects in the villages
and social promotion, as well as subsidized credit for purchasing processing facilities
and to provide agricultural credit for working capital to their members. Meanwhile,
Santana has received highly subsidized credit from the Bank of Northeast Brazil
(Banco do Nordeste do Brasil, BNB) available to all agrarian reform settlements.
Credit includes funds from the Program of Special Credit for Agrarian Reform
(Programa de Crsdito Especial para a Reforma Agrdria, PROCERA) and from the
Constitutional Fund for the Northeast (Fundo Constitucional de Financiamento do
Nordeste, FNE). The former offered credit for land and purchase of livestock. The
latter is a fund set up by the Brazilian Constitution to support the development of the
Northeast.
3) Third, poor members run all three associations. In the case of Santana, poor
farmers have always predominated because they were the ones who struggled for the
land and started the settlement in 1987. But poorer members have not always had
control in the cases of COSENA and COAPEC. Large farmers had created and
dominated both cooperatives in the 1970s, but leadership of the two co-ops shifted to
the smaller farmers in the mid-1980s. The conditions and facts that led to such a
change are described in Chapter 5.
There are also a number of key differences between COSENA and COAPEC
(which are very similar among themselves) on the one hand, and Santana on the other:
1) The first difference relates to their size and ownership structure. COSENA and
COAPEC are much larger in terms of membership and capital investments. They have
Table 1. Summary of main characteristics of the associations.
COSENA COAPEC SANTANA
Location Semiarid zone Semiarid zone Semiarid zone
Year established 1978 1970 1988
Nature of the organization Cooperative of Cooperative of Agrarian reform settlement
individual farmers individual farmers
Main cooperative activity Marketing and Marketing and Collective livestock
processing of cotton processing of cotton production
Number of active members
600 600 60
Number of communities 24 25 One
assisted
Trend of membership Increasing Increasing Stable
Extension services Own Own State government agency
No. of extension
agents 3 3 1
No. of farmers per
extension
agent 400 400 200 (1)
Main funding sources PAPP (2) PAPP (2) Procera (3)
PAPP (2)
FNE (3)
Investments funded by Cotton oil production Cotton ginning/ cotton Dairy facility (cheese
subsidized state programs oil production production)
2 trucks 2 trucks 1 truck
3 Tractors 4 tractors
(1) The extension agent also assists farmers in nearby villages.
(2) PAPP = Program for the Support of Small Farmers
(3) Procera - Program of Special Credit for Agrarian Reform
(4) FNB - Constitutional Fund for the Northeast
about 600 active members each, most of which are sharecroppers, or small holders
owning plots of less than 100 hectares--a small area given the poor soils and low
quality of the vegetation in the semiarid region. They own large-scale facilities for
cotton ginning, cotton oil processing, and livestock feed produced from members'
crops (cotton, corn, and cassava). Santana has only 60 members, and it only owns a
small dairy processing facility to produce cheese during the higher milk production
season (January-May). Most of its capital is comprised of 3,100 hectares of land and
its improvements that their members own collectively.
2) The second difference relates to the main agricultural products in which they
are involved, and the technical dynamism showed by agricultural production. While
COSENA and COAPEC concentrate on the marketing of cotton, Santana raises dual-
purpose beef and dairy livestock. Cotton is a traditional crop for which cultivated area
and production have been declining in all of Ceard since the mid-1980s as a result of a
pest (the boll weevil) attacking the traditional perennial varieties. COSENA's and
COAPEC's cotton producers have been reluctant --as most cotton producers in Ceard--
to apply new technologies or to cultivate different crops. In contrast, Santana's
settlers raise livestock in spite of having been cotton producers before forming the
settlement. Although other agrarian reform settlements in Ceard also raise beef cattle,
Santana differs in that it produces dual-purpose dairy and beef cattle. In contrast to
most livestock producers in the state, who produce based on natural pastures and
obtain low productivity (CEPA 1986), Santana has applied new methods of production
and increased productivity of the livestock production.
3) The third difference relates to their organization of work. While COSENA's
and COAPEC's members produce individually, Santana's settlers produce collectively.
Settlers of Santana organize groups that work in different tasks such as fencing,
feeding the cattle, and preparing the land for crops. Instead of specializing in
particular tasks, these groups rotate every few months so each settler knows how to do
any of the tasks of the settlement and so can substitute freely for each other if needed.
Administrative tasks such as accounting, sales, and relationship with banks are the
only ones for which there is no rotation. Members also plant one-to-two hectare
individual plots with subsistence crops (beans, corn, and cassava).
4) The fourth difference relates to their relationship with state agricultural and
rural development programs and agencies. As a result of their involvement in the
PAPP program, COSENA and COAPEC had a strong relationship with the State
Agricultural Planning Agency (CEPA) and later with the newly created PAPP office in
the State of Ceard Secretariat of Planning (SEPLAN). CEPA chose COSENA and
COAPEC as the first two cooperatives to participate in the 1987 PAPP
decentralization, starting by providing them with funds for the tasks mentioned earlier
(agricultural extension and credit for working capital for their members). Santana is
strongly related to two other government agencies: the National Institute of
Colonization and Agrarian Reform (INCRA), and the Ceard Technical Assistance and
Rural Extension Agency (Emprasa de Assistancia Tgcnica e Extensdo Rural do Ceard,
EMATERCE). This is because both agencies had an early involvement in the creation
of Santana: the former agency expropriated the land and initiated the creation of the
settlement, and the latter provided extension services.
5) Another difference relates to the associations' tasks other than agricultural
production. All three associations operate foodstuffs stores for members. In addition,
COSENA and COAPEC implement small construction projects (e.g. cassava mills and
village stores) using PAPP grants, administer agricultural credit that their members use
for working capital, and sell inputs to both members and non-members.
In the next chapter, I present the main findings concerning agricultural
production in the three associations. I show the striking success of one of the
associations (Santana) in raising livestock, and I explain the most important reasons
for such an unusual outcome. I then focus on the contrasting situation of the other
two associations (COSENA and COAPEC), in which their extension services have
promoted a new technology for cotton inappropriate for most of their members.
CHAPTER 3
FARMER ASSOCIATIONS AND AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION
In this chapter, I turn my attention to decisions taken by the three associations
that led to successful tasks. In the first section I focus on Santana--the most
successful case in terms of agricultural production--arguing that the reasons for its
success relate to decisions settlers made about production, technology, and
organization of work. I compare these findings with what the literature often says
about such things as agricultural production, technology, and collective action.
Santana's decisions about agricultural production differ from those that
COSENA and COAPEC made--resulting in different outcomes. This in spite of the
fact that Santana is located in the same region and thus has a similar climate and
natural resource base. While settlers in Santana selected a production and technology
appropriate to their conditions, COSENA's and COAPEC's extension services
concentrated on promoting a declining crop such as cotton, and within that, a
technology inappropriate for a large part of their membership. The history of the
adoption of this new cotton technology is the focus of the second section.
Raising livestock
Conventional wisdom in Brazil associates livestock production with large
farmers because raising livestock in natural pastures--the traditional technology in
Brazil--requires large amounts of land. Brazilian planners also often associate
livestock (especially beef production) with the low-productivity holdings found
elsewhere in the Northeast (CEPA 1986, 1987, and 1988). In contrast to these
presumptions, Santana has been successful at livestock production. The settlers
produce beef and dairy cattle rather than just beef, and they have been incorporating
new methods of production. While these decisions do not in themselves explain
success, they are the first step to understand how and why Santana worked well.
Santana's livestock production has been quite successful. The settlers have
increased the number of animals per hectare from 0.13 when they took over the land
to a current figure of 0.22.6 Although productivity of dairy production remains lower
than Ceard's average, it is higher than the average of Monsenhor Tabosa and nearby
munictpios in the semiarid zone. The milk production in Santana reached 24.2 liters
per hectare in 1991, as compared to 13.7 liters per hectare in Monsenhor Tabosa, 18.1
liters in Senador Pompeu, and 23.6 liters in Piquet Carneiro. Ceari's average
production reached 33 liters per hectare.
Santana's livestock production has worked well for two reasons:
1) First, dairy production has provided them with higher and more evenly
distributed income than crops alone. Although information for quantifying the
difference between current and past income was not available, all the settlers
interviewed stressed that they eat more and better than before living in Santana. Their
income is also more evenly distributed over the year because it accrues daily instead
of during a short period of the year, as with crop production. Dairy livestock also
turned out to be less risky than crops because adverse climatic conditions affect milk
' The indicator weights one head of sheep or goats as 0.2 head of cattle.
25
production less than agricultural crop production. As one settler points out:
If it does not rain during the first month after planting the beans, you can loose the whole crop.
But a cow only produces less milk during that period, and after the first rain production becomes
normal. It may loose weight, but it is unusual that it dies.
Santana's settlers were to some extent forced to raise livestock; most of
Santana's soils were too poor to support crops. But the large area that they had (3,100
hectares) compensated in part for the poor quality of the soils--something the settlers
knew by looking at the landowners in the area, who obtained high returns with beef
cattle in ranches of similar size. The decision was also in part influenced by the
opinion of tdcnicos from INCRA and EMATERCE who participated in the settlers'
initial discussions. The role of the extension services is further addressed in
subsequent sections. The settlers also like milk production because it provides milk
for their children --a product they lacked access during their times as sharecroppers.
2) Second, the settlers have applied a technology appropriate to their conditions.
Having a high availability of labor, they have used labor-intensive technology, which
is unusual, given that livestock production is known in Brazil for requiring very low
quantities of labor. Most of the livestock producers in Ceard are large landowners
who raise beef cattle and sheep using the low-productive natural pastures. Under these
conditions, raising livestock is a simple process that requires very little labor. While
the previous landowner of Santana had only one person in charge of raising the 400
cattle of his landholding, the current total demand for labor reaches 19 man-years, an
unusually high quantity for a ranch the size of Santana. The settlers of Santana have
applied a technology that requires a great deal of labor--an abundant factor for them:
a) First, the technology used in the set of tasks necessary to feed the livestock--
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the most important task in livestock production--demands lots of labor. The settlers
use improved pastures and grazing to feed cattle instead of the traditional natural
pastures. Most of the varieties of grass used (capim elefante, capim cacho-branco,
capim cacho-roxo, capim braquiana) are more productive if cut instead of grazed.
Consequently, settlers have to harvest the grass-- manually -- and then feed the cattle.
After the harvest, the settlers use machines to chop the grass, mixing it with other
grains, such as wheat, and melaze, and cottonseed meal, to improve the quality of the
feed. This method not only increases the cattle's productivity, but also the use of
labor in the chopping and mixing stages. These tasks require about 11 man-years:
cultivating and harvesting the grass demands about four man-years, chopping the grass
and preparing the feed about four, and moving around the livestock three.
b) Second, the settlers subdivided the ranch into a large number of paddocks to
avoid competition between sheep, goats, and cattle. With these subdivisions, the
livestock can be moved from one field to another according to the availability of grass
in the different pastures. At the same time, cows can be separated from bulls and put
together at the most appropriate time of the year for breeding. Substantial demand for
labor is generated through subdividing: wood must be cut for fences, and the fences
themselves must be built--all requiring about four men-years.
c) The settlers also use irrigation in the improved pastures and grazing. I found
this unusual, not only because irrigation is often expensive and difficult to learn, but
also because it is often associated with crops rather than livestock. A grant from the
Program of Special Credit for Agrarian Reform (Programa de Crdito Especial para a
Reforma Agrdria, PROCERA) provided the settlers with irrigation equipment in 1989.
With the help of the EMATERCE's extension agent, the settlers started to learn how
to use the equipment. The irrigation system requires about three men-year to operate
and maintain the equipment.
d) Settlers have improved the genetic quality of the livestock by buying high
quality bulls and rams from outside of Ceard (especially in the neighbor state of
Penambuco), which consequently led to increased milk and beef production. Because
higher quality livestock are less resistant to diseases than the native, low-productive
animals, they require more frequent and better sanitary treatment, e.g. more frequent
vaccinations and baths against parasites. These tasks have also increased the demand
for labor to about one man-year.
The experience of Santana shows that raising livestock--especially for dairy
production--may be a good alternative for small farmers in Ceari. The state
government recognizes this potential, the PAPP program including dairy production in
some of the most recent projects (e.g. the new project for COSENA). The lessons that
Santana provides relate to the organization of production and the technology of dairy
production. PAPP does not deal with the land constraints that small farmers face to
raise livestock, giving credit to individual farmers for the purchase of one or a few
animals. The evidence from Santana suggests that a successful dairy production
among small farmers may require some kind of collective arrangements in land use.
The collective use of the land--achieved through agrarian reform or other means--may
be an appropriate solution to the relatively high amount of land required to raise
livestock in the semiarid zone. In addition, Santana shows that effective livestock-
raising need not be capital intensive: a labor-intensive technology of the livestock
production has been appropriate to their conditions, providing employment and
increasing productivity.
The question of how the settlers of Santana decided to adopt this elaborate
organization of production and technology will be addressed in the following pages.
But first I want to contrast Santana's production with the experiences of COSENA and
COAPEC.
A New Technology for Cotton?
In contrast to Santana, members of COSENA and COAPEC have been
producing the same crops, and a high proportion of them have not adopted new
technology despite the efforts of the cooperatives' extension services to introduce new
practices to reduce the impact of the boll weevil. In this section, I argue that only co-
op members who are small holders found the new cotton technology attractive. In
contrast, the sharecroppers--who comprise most of both co-ops' membership--found
the new cotton technology to be inappropriate.
The damage caused to cotton by the boll weevil is illustrated in Table 2. The
amount of land in Ceard under cotton cultivation decreased 73%, from an annual
average of 1,218,000 hectares between 1975 and 1980 to only 330,000 hectares
between 1987 and 1991. Total production in the same periods decreased 69%, from
an annual average of 197,000 tons to 62,000 tons (IBGE 1975-1991). Such a decline
affected all of the municipios in Ceard As a result, COSENA's average annual
purchases fell 40% from the 1979-1986 period to the 1987-1991 period.
Table 2. Area under cotton cultivation in Ceard from 1975 to 1991.
Year % ANNUAL % PERENNIAL TOTAL
COTTON COTTON AREA
(hectares)
1975 7.0 93.0 1,123,000
1976 4.6 95.4 1,048,000
1991 32.1 67.9 226,190
* 1 acre = 0.41 hectares
Source: IBGE. Anuarios Estadisticos do Brasil, 1975-1991.
Partially as a result of the decline in cotton production, both COSENA and
COAPEC have had unsatisfactory financial returns." The Ceard Agricultural Research
Agency (Empresa de Pesquisa Agropecudria do Ceard, EPACE) suggested a new
technology based on the replacement of the traditional perennial cotton by a new
variety of annual cotton. EMATERCE has been promoting this new technology in all
Ceard, and COSENA's and COAPEC's extension services attempted to bring it to their
members. But the rate of adoption has been low (see table 2), and with good reason.
" COAPEC does not have data on purchases for before 1985, but its leaders estimate that the decrease
in the purchase of cotton reached similar levels to those in COSENA.
' Financial problems were not only due to the decline in cotton production. Both coops also suffered
delays in receiving funds from PAPP. Because the coops were highly dependent on this funding and the
period was characterized by a monthly inflation of about 20%, delays affected significantly their financial
results. As a result, the coops frequently were not able to purchase members' production on time, pay the
extension agents' salaries, or provide fuel for their field trips.
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Most of the cotton in Ceard is cultivated by sharecroppers,9 and the landlords
have been reluctant to let the sharecroppers adopt the annual variety, in part, because
it is not compatible with their livestock production. Cotton stubble provides a
significant quantity of feed during the dry season, when the production of the natural
pastures decreases. This period coincides with the cotton harvest, so the landlord uses
the stubble in the perennial cotton fields to feed his cattle. In contrast to perennial
cotton, annual cotton fields do not provide feed for the cattle after the harvest. The
plants are smaller, leaving less stubble than with perennial plants. Moreover, because
the land used to plant annual cotton must be more carefully prepared to avoid weeds
and grass, almost no grass remains after the harvest. This resulted in many landlords
simply not providing sharecroppers with necessary inputs to cultivate it. Many
landlords even prohibit the growing of annual cotton by their sharecroppers.
Not only do the landlords find the annual cotton unattractive, but the
sharecroppers also find it expensive, risky, and inconvenient. In contrast to perennial
cotton, annual cotton is not drought-resistant, so it requires irrigation to produce high
yields. In addition, it demands better soils and more careful soil preparation; the
technological package also includes pesticides to control the boll weevil. All these
components of the new technology make it very expensive. Evaluations report that
9 About 63% of COSENA's members are sharecroppers. Although COAPEC does not collect data with
respect to the land tenure of its members, their leaders estimate that the proportion of sharecroppers is
similar to COSENA's. The arrangements between landowner and sharecroppers vary significantly. In
general, the landowner prepares the land and provides some of the inputs while the sharecropper provides
the labor. The sharecropper pays a rent to the landowner of between 30% and 50% of the cotton
production, a proportion that depends on the contribution of the landowner to the inputs required by the
crop. In addition, sharecroppers usually sell their own cotton production through the landowner. Sometimes
this is part of the terms of the relationship, but it is frequently motivated by the sharecropper's need for
cash.
irrigation increases the cost of production per hectare of annual cotton by 194%."*
The advantage of the annual cotton, however, is that it produces much higher yields
than perennial cotton. Reasonable yields in Ceard would be 120 kilograms per hectare
for perennial cotton, 800 kilograms per hectare for non-irrigated annual, and 1800
kilograms per hectare for irrigated annual. Without the means to adopt the whole
technological package, farmers often choose to adopt the cheaper components of the
package, such as the seeds or the pesticides, but not the most costly components,
particularly irrigation. Thus, the possibility of obtaining higher yields depends on the
rainfall levels during the growing cycle. In a dry year, a farmer cultivating annual
cotton may obtain similar yields as with perennial cotton, but incur higher costs.
Consequently, this new technology--at least in the way in which it has been most
commonly adopted--implies higher risks. Moreover, annual cotton should not be
interplanted with subsistence crops, a common practice when cultivating perennial
cotton. This makes it even more unattractive for sharecroppers. It is rare that the
interests of both landowners and sharecroppers converge. In this instance, however,
they coincided exactly in rejecting the annual cotton.
Not all farmers have been against the annual cotton, however. My interviews
with members of COSENA and COAPEC show that most small landowners (in all
cases less than 100 hectares) saw the new variety as an attractive alternative. One of
these farmers said:
10 The data comes from unpublished reports of SEPLAN about the technological change of cotton
production in Ceard.
The boll weevil was destroying the only source of cash income of my family. If you own a small
plot of land, you can't raise livestock and you don't have too many other options. The annual
cotton is the best option for me, and the co-op gives me credit for the inputs.
The decline of cotton production has had important economic and social effects
in Ceard. Sharecropping itself has become less common in the state because
sharecroppers lack any viable alternatives when they cannot grow cotton profitably.
Many sharecroppers have been substituting com and beans for cotton, but others have
abandoned the agricultural sector to join the mass of migrants going to Fortaleza and
southern Brazil. At the same time, landowners have replaced areas formerly under
cotton cultivation with low-productivity livestock.
From the sequence of events presented above, one could ask why both
EMATERCE's and the cooperatives' extension services have been promoting annual
cotton. The state government agricultural research agency (EPACE) took the
technology of the annual cotton crop produced commonly in the south of Brazil, and
attempted to adapt the technological package to the conditions of the semiarid
Northeast. However, Ceard differs from southern Brazil not just in climate but also in
structural characteristics such as land distribution and land tenure. The sharecropping
system is typical of the Northeast but uncommon in the South; most cotton producers
in the South are landowners. EPACE failed to consider the implications of cotton as
the foundation of the Northeast's sharecropping system, and failed to predict the
unfavorable attitudes of both sharecroppers and large landowners toward the new
technology.
Almost all the extension agents I interviewed (from EMATERCE, COSENA,
and COAPEC) were disappointed with the results of the annual cotton. In the words
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of an EMATERCE's supervisor, who had worked in the field for fifteen years:
The annual cotton is an invention of the companies selling inputs. If the farmer has access to
irrigation it may be convenient, but if he doesn't, the perennial cotton gives higher yields, even
with the attacks by the boll weevil. Many of us [EMATERCE's extension agents] are convinced
that perennial cotton is still a much better option for small farmers than annual cotton.
In fact, this opinion is common among EMATERCE extension agents. Many
extension agents said that they openly encourage small farmers to use the perennial
cotton instead of the annual varieties. The insistence by COSENA's and COAPEC's
extension services on retaining an inappropriate technology for a declining crop has
been one of the main reasons why so little annual cotton was adopted by co-ops'
members. This is similar to what has been taking place in the rest of Ceard.
The state government has not yet responded to these problems with any major
change in research and extension policies. Upper level officials I interviewed in
EMATERCE and SEPLAN recognized that the new technology for cotton was having
"mixed results", but I feel that these officials were not yet convinced of its failure. In
part, this relates to the quite recent promotion of the new cotton technology in Ceard
and lack of any major formal evaluation of how it was adopted, why, and by whom.
Political problems not addressed here have isolated EMATERCE, the agency with
more field experience, from SEPLAN and other planning agencies in charge of the
agricultural policy design. All this has made it even more difficult to address the
problem of cotton production.
In summary, this section shows that raising livestock--especially for dairy
production--may be a good alternative for small farmers in Cear6. Small farmers have
too little land to feed the cattle, so a successful livestock production may require
collective use of the land. This may be obvious for other contexts where raising
livestock (though using a less sophisticated technology) is a traditional production
among small farmers (e.g. in Africa). In Brazil and Latin America in general,
however, peasants cultivate subsistence crops like corn and beans rather than livestock.
In addition, Santana's experience with livestock shows that a successful program does
not necessarily have to build upon what the beneficiaries already know. A correct
selection of the product and the technology are much more important than how easy
farmers may learn the new technologies.
This section also shows that the new cotton technology has been inappropriate
for most of the farmers in Ceard. This explains the low rate of adoption of annual
cotton, the decline in the cultivated area of cotton, and the frequent adoption of some
components of the new technology rather than the whole package. It also helps
explain the financial problems of COSENA and COAPEC, as well as those of most of
the farmer associations in Ceard organized around the marketing of cotton.
Interestingly, the evidence shows that small holders found the annual cotton attractive.
However, it was the lack of other alternatives for small landowners rather than the
intrinsic advantages of the new technology which explains this attraction. Although
upper level officials and planners working at the government planning agencies have
not ignored the problems of the annual cotton, they have not changed their policies.
The evidence shown in this chapter may suggest that government agencies could at
least re-formulate some of the policies supporting the new technology, like credit and
technical assistance, by targeting those most likely adopters to adopt it--the small
landowners rather than more generally "the small farmers".
CHAPTER 4
DEALING WITH THE EXTENSION SERVICES:
PRIVATE OR STATE PROVISION?
Recent developments in the public finance literature stress on user charges and
privatization of public services as two major policies for expanding the source of
revenue of local and national governments and for improving service quality. User
charges are intended to recover service costs and ensure a more "efficient" service
provision." Privatization of some services provided by the public sector may
improve fiscal balances and increase service quality because beneficiaries can
participate, and private providers are more efficient and accountable if certain
conditions are met (Donahue 1992, Rothenberg 1987, Roth 1988). Some authors
stress the important role that non-governmental institutions such as cooperatives,
membership organizations, and service organizations already play in providing services
in rural areas of developing countries (Uphoff 1986). My interviews in Cear6 show
that many officials and planners at the State of Ceard's Secretariat of Planning
(SEPLAN) share this point of view when thinking about the provision of extension
services to farmers. Some of them stress the potential benefits of privatization over
the fiscal accounts and the quality of the service. Others think that privatization may
strengthen grassroots organizations if small farmer associations become the new
" The efficiency argument calls for setting the price of the service equal to the marginal costs of
producing it. The justification is that welfare is maximized when the benefit of an additional unit of the
service to the consumer--reflected by his willingness to pay the price--is equal to the cost of producing this
additional unit, that is, its marginal costs. See, for example, Babl and Linn (1992), Cochrane (1983), Davey
(1983), and Fisher (1988).
service providers. Both perspectives also point out that EMATERCE, the principal
technical assistance provider to Santana, has consistently received poor ratings in
evaluation reports of rural development programs in the Northeast. Most of these
evaluations have stressed the need for more participation by farmers in the design and
evaluation of technical assistance. This explains, in part, why the PAPP program
decided to fund cooperatives and associations to provide extension services after
funding EMATERCE for many years.
In the first section of this chapter I show that EMATERCE has worked
reasonably well in Santana because the settlers negotiated informal working
arrangements with the extension agent. These unusual arrangements allowed them to
define their demands and to monitor the extensionist's tasks. In the second section I
show that COSENA has been able to recover part of the extension service costs by
charging its members fees for specific tasks. The evidence shown in the two sections
suggests that the dichotomy between public-private service may not be the major
policy problem in Ceari, and that recovering part of the service costs may be possible
even when most of the "users" are poor farmers.
Recipients or Demanders? Farmers Planning and Monitoring the Extension
Services
In spite of numerous recommendations to involve farmers in the design and
evaluation of technical assistance,12 successful examples of participation in the
12 World Bank files, including evaluations of rural development programs and of agricultural extension
in Brazil.
provision of extension services are rare because both officials and extension agents
often oppose it." The good results that Santana obtained in agricultural production,
however, reflects precisely the high degree of participation by settlers in planning,
monitoring, and evaluating the tasks of EMATERCE extension agent--something
different the other cases studied here and quite unusual in Ceard. This situation
contradicts the widely-held belief that government agencies always tend to deliver a
more top-down style of service while cooperatives or non-governmental organizations
incorporate farmers' opinions to a greater degree.
How did farmers participate in the three cases studied here? Both COSENA
and COAPEC provide extension services to their members, which do not receive
services from EMATERCE. The cooperative manager and the extension agents define
the extension tasks themselves without consulting farmers on issues such as the
number and order of visits to the different villages. Both co-ops hired young ticnicos
who had little or no previous experience and were usually born in the munictpio.
Most of the farmers I interviewed stressed that the latter improved their good
relationship with the cooperative extension agents as compared with the EMATERCE
ones, who may be from anywhere. However, though extension agents discussed many
aspects of the service with the farmers in every village, it was the cooperative
manager and not the villagers that planned and evaluated the extension agents' work.
Thus, the farmers had a quite passive role in the relationship with the co-op extension
1 See Tendler (1991) in reference to Northeast Brazil. Also see Moore (1984) for an analysis of this
and other problems of a World Bank funded agricultural extension program in India.
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agent. The same situation occurs in the case of EMATERCE's technical assistance.
The extension agent defines the agenda with his supervisor--having even fewer
discussions with farmers than in COSENA and COAPEC--and the supervisor monitors
and evaluates his work.
In contrast to COSENA and COAPEC, as well as most farmers visited by
EMATERCE in Ceard, Santana's leaders had a relationship with the EMATERCE
extension agent that was more like a boss-employee than a farmer-extension agent one.
Santana's leaders periodically provided the EMATERCE agent with a list of priority
activities that required his advice, e.g. the irrigation of a new improved pasture, the
vaccination of cattle, or the attention to some disease in pastures or livestock.
Sometimes the extension agent suggested some activity that required urgent attention,
but in general he followed the list he was given. This working arrangement is unusual
in Ceard, where EMATERCE has repeatedly opposed working under such terms when
PAPP proposed them after program evaluations.
Why did the extension agent working in Santana accept these terms if
EMATERCE disagreed with this approach? One of the reasons was that the settlers
provided him with room and board not only when he visited the agrarian reform
settlement, but also when he visited other nearby villages. Santana's leaders and the
extension agent developed this arrangement about three years ago, when EMATERCE
experienced delays in receiving government funds. Since EMATERCE could not pay
the agent's per diem, the group thought of the arrangement in order to avoid long
periods between visits. Later, room and board continued to represent an indirect
addition to the agent's income when EMATERCE was able to pay its technical staff's
expenses.
In part, Santana's leaders view the situation in political terms. They provide
room and board when the extensionist visits nearby villages because the political
influence of the group would increase, convincing other farmers that agrarian reform
and collective production work well. The settlers were willing to pay the extensionist
also because the agent was able to perform tasks that they did not know how to
complete. For example, the settlers had begun to irrigate their pastures only a few
years earlier, and consequently did not have any experience repairing engines that
powered the system. If the engines failed and they could not irrigate, the milk yields
would drop in just a few days because the production of grass for feeding the cattle
would fall. Because the extension agent had experience with machinery, settlers asked
him for help every time they had some relatively simple problem with the irrigation
equipment that they could not solve. Although the extension agent knew that repairing
machines was not part of his job, he agreed to perform these services because he
received food and lodging in exchange.
Most important, the arrangement between the extensionist and the settlers
works well because it makes the agent's work easier by giving him a clear picture of
what the settlers perceive as problems. In his own words:
It is much better for me to arrive at a farm knowing what I have to do than start to figure out what
to do. The latter situation --which is the most frequent one-- is terrible considering that we do
not have too much time to spend in a single farm.
As the list that Santana provides includes activities to be done about three weeks
hence, the extension agent has enough time to do the necessary research or
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background work, such as discussing with other extension agents about a certain
problem, or reviewing some of his books to define the possible ways of solving it.
From the settlers' point of view, setting a list of tasks represents an effective way to
maximize the extension agent's time during his visits to the settlement, and gives them
a basis for evaluating the extension agent's work. This arrangement remains
completely informal because the EMATERCE extension agent is still evaluated by the
normal hierarchical levels and criteria of the extension agency."
This arrangement, however, could only occur because the extension agent and
the settlers had developed a relationship based on trust during the early stages of the
settlement. The EMATERCE agent had participated with tMcnicos from INCRA in
meetings that the settlers had immediately after they settled in Santana's lands, helping
them in their discussions about production and organization of their work. The agent
not only knew how Santana had evolved, he also felt that his participation had been
important in early decision-making, and consequently did not feel that the settlers were
"imposing" a way of working on him. In other words, the early involvement gave the
agent some control --or a sense of control-- of the decisions concerning production.
In addition, the recruitment of the extension agent in Santana diverged from the
usual form, in which EMATERCE assigned extension agents to particular locations
without farmer participation in such decisions. Santana's leaders stress the fact that
they have to know the person or have information that he is committed to agrarian
" The evaluation criteria used by EMATERCE include traditional indicators that have been criticized
(Tendler 1984, Moore 1984) for not representing accurately the effectiveness of technical assistance, such
as the number of farmers visited and the total number of visits.
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reform. They consider it important to build a relationship based on trust because they
feel that an extension agent with a divergent opinion could threaten their existence as
a cohesive group. The settlers started setting such criteria because they had problems
with another EMATERCE extension agent a few years ago. This agent had reportedly
encouraged settlers to work individually rather than collectively, helping to deepen
divergent opinions between two opposing groups. This problem resulted in some
settlers, who did not agree with continuing with collective production, abandoning the
settlement. In contrast, a committed extension agent, who shares the groups' long-
term objectives, can facilitate a good relationship within the group of settlers. Settlers
find it easier when he works under their conditions and are willing to rely more on his
advice.
It is surprising that EMATERCE negotiated with Santana for having a
particular extensionist assigned to them--an unusual occurrence for a govenment
extension service. This happened because the success of Santana was well known to
the state government and even outside Ceari. This visibility gave Santana more
prestige and thus bargaining power with the government. In addition, they were
supported in these negotiations by two important agrarian reform groups: the Landless
Rural Workers' Movement (Movimento dos Sem Terra, MST) and the newly created
Central Cooperative of Agrarian Reform Settlements (Cooperativa Central dos
Asentamentos da Reforma Agrdria CCA). Both organizations received the help of
technicians committed to agrarian reform, especially agronomists who helped the
settlers in the negotiations with EMATERCE. The negotiations between Santana and
EMATERCE to have a particular extension agent were highly informal. Usually,
either Santana's leaders or an agronomist working closely with MST knew of an
EMATERCE extension agent in a different municipality who was willing to work in
the municipality of Monsenhor Tabosa. Since most agronomists and agricultural
technicians in Ceard know each other, they also knew whether he was committed to
agrarian reform. Sometimes, the extension agent would ask to be assigned to
Monsenhor Tabosa and would be transferred to that municipality. Other times, there
was a scissor movement: the EMATERCE extension agent would ask to be deployed
to Monsenhor Tabosa and Santana's leaders would ask EMATERCE's supervisors in
Fortaleza to have him sent to their munictpio.
In summary, the informal working arrangements between Santana and the
extension agent are partly responsible for the success of Santana in agricultural
production. While the experience of Santana may support the case for groups of
farmers hiring their own extensionists, the experience of COSENA and COAPEC--as I
show later-- contradicts this. In Santana, these arrangements were possible even
though Santana received extension services from a state government agency. Thus,
the problems with the agricultural extension in Ceard and elsewhere in the Northeast
may be more related to the kind of working arrangements set up with the extension
agents than with the dichotomy of public vs. private service provision. In Santana, a
simple list of tasks allowed the settlers to define what they considered major problems
and to monitor the work of the extension agent. Trust relations based on an early
involvement of the extension agent in the period of initiating the settlement and on a
common ideology facilitated the infonnal arrangements between the settlers and the
extensionist. These arrangements also enhanced the agent's job satisfaction, which
includes having a friendly relationship with farmers and working in a challenging
environment. "Farmers who are demanding and receptive to technical advice at the
same time are the model that any extensionist would like to have", the EMATERCE
extensionist said.
To conclude, working arrangements like the ones between Santana and the
EMATERCE extension agent may have beneficial effects in the quality of the
technical assistance, independently of the public or private nature of the service. Two
questions concerning the development of Santana's relationship with the extension
agent remain to be answered. How did the settlers learn to negotiate and be
demanding with public agencies? What special circumstances made these settlers open
to technical assistance and training? I will retum to these questions in Chapter 5.
Recovering Service Costs
All the associations studied here regularly faced delays in receiving government
funds. With an inflation rate of 20 to 25% monthly, receiving loans and grants one or
two months later than expected meant receiving significantly fewer funds."
COSENA and COAPEC, for example, received funding from PAPP to cover the costs
of salaries, gas, and maintenance of vehicles for their extension services. When such
delays occurred, the cooperatives could not pay the salaries of the extension agents,
"5 Delays in the transfer of federal counterpart funding to the states characterized the Northeast projects
supported by the World Bank during the 1980s (Tendler 1991).
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creating a permanent state of dissatisfaction and disappointment among them.
Although the extension agents normally continued to work, the lack of money for gas
and spare parts frequently prevented them from going to the fields to visit farmers.
Like the co-ops, EMATERCE frequently received state and federal funds late and
could not pay the extension agents' per diem, the amount they are supposed to receive
in order to cover expenses for food and lodging in the field. Therefore, Santana also
suffered from lack of continuity of the technical assistance.
Planners and project evaluators have often suggested that one strategy for
avoiding such funding problems would be to recover the costs of extension services
from farmers by charging them for these services.' However, leaders of COSENA
and COAPEC argue that most of their members do not have the means to pay any
fees. Moreover, medium-sized members, who could afford to pay for services, are
frequently reluctant to do so when they do not expect to receive immediate benefits.
For these reasons, COSENA's and COAPEC's leaders are reluctant to charge farmers
for the cost of extension services.17
Delays in receiving government funds forced the associations to find new ways
to support their programs. One strategy was described in the last section, and
consisted of Santana providing room and board to the EMATERCE extension agent
when the agency was unable to pay his per diem. The second example involves
" This view is based on an extensive literature in the field of public finance that argues for the cost
recovery of services through user charges. For example, see Bahl and Linn (1992), Cochrane (1983), Davey
(1983), and Fisher (1988).
" Most of the officials from EMATERCE and PAPP that I interviewed also disagreed with the idea of
charging for extension services due to the extreme poverty of the beneficiaries of the PAPP program.
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COSENA partially recovering the costs of technical assistance by charging fees for
certain specialized services. COSENA charges a fee equal to the cost of gas to any
farmer requesting a visit by the extension agents for veterinary services. Although this
fee was low and it represented a low proportion of the total cost of the service, the
cooperative was able to use the money thus collected to purchase fuel for the agents'
vehicles in difficult financial periods. This allowed the agents to visit small farmers
the same day that they visited the larger one requiring veterinary services, and it
reduced the periods in which the co-op extension agents were not able to go to the
field due to the lack of gas. While most of the cooperative members have one or two
cows to meet their subsistence needs, those requiring veterinary services usually
specialize in beef and dairy livestock production and have larger herds. Because they
were among the better-off members, co-op managers thought that they would be more
able to pay for services.
The decision to charge for veterinary services turned out to work well not only
because the affected farmers were better able to pay, but also because farmers
expected to have high losses if they did not receive the services. Veterinary services
usually involve emergency care, such as cesarean sections for cows or other kinds of
surgery, without which the farmer may lose the animal. This potential for loss
provides a strong incentive for farmers to take an interest in technical assistance and to
assume some costs. Moreover, farmers who received veterinary services see an
immediate benefit, in the shape of a recovering animal. In contrast, the higher yields
promised if farmers follow extension agents' advice concerning their crops do not
materialize until several months later, if at all. In Santana, the settlers paid the
extension agent because he repaired irrigation machinery --a task not included in
EMATERCE's normal service. As in the veterinary services case, the magnitude of
the potential losses, coupled with the high cost and scarcity of engine mechanics in the
region, motivated Santana's settlers to share costs of the extension services.
In summary, both farmer associations and EMATERCE were able to recover
part of the costs of the extension services. The experience of COSENA shows that
charging for veterinary services allowed the co-op to recover part of the extension
services' costs without affecting the poorer members. The fees turned out to be
distributionally desirable, involving an implicit "cross subsidy" effect to the smaller
farmers from farmers doing livestock, who usually have more land and are the better-
off. The evidence from Santana also shows that EMATERCE might actually be able
to recover some of its service-costs, contrary to its current claim, by making
agreements with farmer associations such as those discussed in the last section. For
example, the agency could provide basic services for free but charge for additional
services not included in the basic fare, such as equipment maintenance. Because
farmers and associations find it easier to pay in kind than in cash, the fee for
additional services could include food and lodging. The extension agent could receive
additional compensation for the additional services he provides, and this would
encourage him to receive further training.
In the next chapter, I focus on the factors that explain why members of the
three associations joined to form them or to take over control of them.
CHAPTER 5
ORGANIZING FOR EFFECTIVE COLLECTIVE ACTION
In this chapter, I draw on the history of the three associations to explain what
made it possible for poor members to dominate all of them. This is not only relevant
by itself, but also because it helps explain why they were able to do what they did
well.
Sharecroppers Undertaking Collective Production
Most of the literature about collective property resources focuses on their
problems rather than their successes."' Such perspectives also characterize most of
the literature on agrarian reform, which stresses that these reforms often fail.'9 This
section focuses on the history of Santana and aims to identify the conditions that
resulted in its success. I argue that although the working of Santana as a collective
entity is impressive, it shares the historical roots and many of the achievements of
other groups in Ceard and other parts of Brazil. What makes Santana different--and
probably not replicable--is the presence of many unusual people, including motivated
and dedicated leadership. The self-selection of the group members and the option to
exit the group explain in part these features of Santana.
1 For a different perspective, see Ostrom (1990), Ostrom et al (1990), and Wade (1986).
19 See for example De Janvry (1981) and Grindle (1986). For an argument for agrarian reform in
developing countries see Adelman (1979), and for Northeast Brazil see Kutcher and Scandizzo (1981). For
a more critical review of agrarian reform cases in different Latin American countries, see Thiesenhusen
(1989).
As elsewhere in Brazil, the settlers of Santana have a long history of
cooperation, bound together by their work with the Catholic Church. In the early
1960s, local priests began to promote grassroots groups, the "Christian Base
Communities" (Comunidades Eclesiais de Base CEBs) in Monsenhor Tabosa.2 o The
parents of the current settlers of Santana worked part of their time collectively on
lands owned by the Church. Priests introduced these collective work programs called
mutirdo, which consisted of the exchange of workdays by small groups of peasants,
usually about five persons per group. Group members would work together, for
example, planting corn and beans on the plot belonging to one of their members for
one week. The following week, they would work on the plot belonging to a different
member. As in other parts of Ceard, peasants liked the mutirdo. It made some tasks
easier that were too difficult for one person to do, such as plowing or cleaning the
land.
Many rural communities in Brazil share a similar history as the settlers of
Santana, emerging from the work of the CEBs. After the new democratic government
approved the agrarian reform law in 1986, Santana, and many other groups of landless
peasants like Santana in the Northeast and the rest of Brazil, were successful in their
20 The Church promoted the creation of some 80,000 CEBs throughout Brazil, each one including 50
to 100 people. The CEBs first began as discussion groups in Northeast Brazil at the beginning of the 1960s.
Having an enormous receptivity among the rural poor, the Brazilian episcopal hierarchy supported them
officially since the mid-1960s. The CEBs spread out all over Brazil at the end of the 1960s and often
evolved into more active roles, such as undertaking "land occupations" to claim for land. Many authors
stress the crucial role of the CEBs in raising the consciousness of the rural poor in Brazil and their
motivation to enter into social movements. See Della Cava (1989) and Mainwaring (1986) for an analysis
of the role of the Catholic Church and the CEBs in the Brazilian transition to democracy between 1974-
1985.
demands for land. In that sense, Santana is not a unique case. What makes Santana
different from other non-successful cases is that it has an unusual number of qualified
leaders and members with outstanding characteristics.2 1 Unlike many other groups,
in which one or two leaders "run the show", Santana has at least ten leaders who not
only use their natural abilities for public speaking during the group meetings, but also
supervise work teams, are in charge of the marketing of Santana's products, and of
negotiating with the EMATERCE extensionist and with public agencies. These
leaders speak about the history of the group with pride, but they speak more about the
present and future of Santana. They argue with great conviction about the advantages
of the collective use of the land--in strikingly "capitalist" terms. One of the leaders
said: "We think our cooperative as a private enterprise. We are here to make profits
because it is the only way we can improve the living conditions of our people." This
particular view of the world (which blends the belief in socialism with an
entrepreneurial "pragmatism") is typical of Santana's members, and it cannot be
explained by the effects of a particular program or project.
In part, the exceptional characteristics of the settlers relates to a self-selection
of the participants--something unusual in the experience of agrarian reform. While
agrarian reform programs often benefits first the workers who previously lived or
worked for the land, the settlers worked as sharecroppers in lands nearby rather than in
the lands that currently comprise Santana. In these lands, only a few sharecroppers
21 Burdick (1991) argues that the success of a particular CEB had more to do with the characteristics
of its members and their understandings of the CEB purpose and message. In a case study of one CEB,
he found that illiterate people with heavy and inflexible labor schedules, blacks, and married women facing
domestic conflict found the CEB less useful and thus participated less.
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lived and only two of them finally join the group. In 1986, the representative of the
Union of Rural Workers (Sindicato dos Trabalhadores Rurais) in Monsenhor Tabosa
spread the word that the owner of the lands comprising present-day Santana did not
have legal titles for the land--something that they soon confirmed. The settlers, who
were already organized, presented their claim at the INCRA in 1986 and occupied the
land. Only those willing to confront the risks of the struggle participated. All were
young people (most of the settlers are now between 25 and 35 years old)--in contrast
to most agrarian reform settlements in Ceard, in which settlers are of different ages.
All of them had participated in christian youth groups in addition to working in
mutirdo. Local priests also promoted these groups, which discussed daily problems
and promoted collective solutions. Their discussions involved, for example, the lack
of land they suffered, the high rents they had to pay, and the possible solutions to the
high prices of the local foodstuff store.
The youth groups represented an opportunity for young people to develop
relations based on solidarity--values that the priests emphasized. They also learned
how to jointly discuss problems, propose solutions, and undertake concrete and
successful actions. For example, in the early 1980s, these meetings resulted in the
creation of a foodstuffs store that they managed collectively. A group started it in
response to the high prices charged by the only local consumer store, owned by the
landowner.
The settlers also created the option to exit the group without loosing all of the
work done by the departing members. Once they decided to own the land and
produce collectively, many of the people who wanted to produce individually left the
group. At that point, the settlers established the rule that allows members who do not
want to work collectively to quit the settlement, receiving their share of the profit
generated while they lived at Santana.
In summary, self-selection and the option to exit helped a group of young
exceptional people with a long, commonly-held experience in collective action come
together in a particular moment--after the federal government approved the agrarian
reform program. While this explanation may not be new, it is essential to explain why
Santana was successful in achieving the things explained in previous sections. The
experience of Santana as a whole may be unique, and none of its components may by
themselves explain Santana's success on its own, but lessons can be drawn from what
Santana did (e.g. the dairy production unusual in agrarian reform settlements), and
how it did it (applying new labor-intensive technologies and collectively using the
land). These components were the focus of previous sections.
Small Farmers Taking Over COSENA and COAPEC
Until the middle 1980s, a group of middle-sized and large farmers dominated
both COSENA's and COAPEC's decision-making. Some of the most powerful
members of the local elites were part of both groups. These large farmers had created
both cooperatives in the 1970s in order to take advantage of subsidized credit from the
Bank of Brazil for cooperatives based in ginning and marketing of cotton--a crop that
planners of POLONORDESTE (and also CEPA in Ceari) perceived as the most
important for the development of the Northeast. Through the cooperatives, the large
farmers wanted to obtain economies of scale in the marketing and processing of
cotton.22 Because the small farmers produced a significant fraction of the region's
cotton crop, the large farmers needed their participation in the new cooperatives. At
the same time, small farmers had few options other than joining the newly created co-
ops. In any case, most of them were sharecroppers and their landlords forced them to
join in. But, small landowners also perceived that the cooperatives could give them a
better price for their cotton. Thus, small farmers soon dominated membership of both
COSENA and COAPEC, even though the leadership remained in the hands of the
large farmers. These large farmers controlled the main bodies of the co-ops: a Board
of Directors elected by the active members every four years, an Assembly, and a
Fiscal Board. This was normal in all the 35 rural cooperatives in Ceard. How were
the poor members of COSENA and COAPEC able to take over their cooperatives?
I argue that the change in leadership in COSENA and COAPEC relates to the
combination of two factors. First, an education component of a state program which
succeeded in promoting the participation of the poorer members of the co-ops.
Second, the contradictory effects of the new cotton technology over the motivation of
small and large farmers to participate in the co-ops.
22 The processing of agricultural products that require heavy equipment promotes the collaboration
between small and large farmers because fixed costs can be shared among more farmers and equipment can
be used at full capacity (Attwood 1987, Attwood and Baviskar 1987).
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A Successful Educational Program
The changeover in leadership from large to small farmers only took place in
the middle 1980s. During that period, the poorer members of COSENA and COAPEC
became increasingly involved in the cooperatives' decision-making. One of the
reasons why this happened was the success of an educational component of the
POLONORDESTE program, which raised small farmers' consciousness about the
benefits of participating in assemblies and meetings. This is unusual because even
though many programs attempt to increase farmers participation, they often fail
because they face elite opposition (Tendler 1982 & 1991).
POLONORDESTE's educational component was successful in part because it
did not face--at least at the beginning--elite opposition. Just the opposite. CEPA (the
implementing agency of POLONORDESTE) designed the program in such a way that
the leadership of COSENA and COAPEC received strong pressures from their own
upper level organizations to implement it. In fact, CEPA contracted the
implementation of the program with the CearA Organization of Cooperatives
(Organizagdo das Cooperativas do Estado do Ceard, OCEC), the state level
organization of cooperatives dominated by the large farmers. Such a program design
was possible because CEPA was integrated by leftist tcnicos and managers who were
committed to social change in the rural areas. Some of these managers had a long
experience working with rural programs in Ceard and knew that the program would
fail if elites opposed it. CEPA offered OCEC funds to implement the program
throughout the state, but put the condition that CEPA would participate actively in the
hiring of staff. OCEC engaged in the program because its leaders thought that it
would provide their organization with substantial funding. They did not think that the
program would harm their position. One of these leaders, who later became President
of OCEC pointed out: "We never thought that the educational activities would cause
so many problems." CEPA has succeeded in creating pressures from above over the
cooperatives' leadership to implement the educational activities.
At the same time that the program created pressure from above to implement
the educational activities, it promoted the mobilization of grassroots groups created by
the Catholic Church in earlier years of its work. Local priests had been working with
community groups in Senador Pompeu and Piquet Cameiro. These groups were part
of a successful major effort of the Catholic Church to mobilize the poor in all of rural
Brazil." In order to contact these grassroots groups, CEPA managers hired a group
of 20 committed and motivated staff members to work on the educational tasks of the
program. Most of these staff members thought that the support of CEPA could bring
an opportunity to promote change in a very concrete and achievable way through the
mobilization of the poorer members of Ceard's cooperatives. A former Director of
CEPA pointed out:
The staff we hired comprised people we knew and trusted. Some of them came from vocational
schools, but most of them had gained their experience working for Catholic Church groups. This
made it easier to work with local people, to gain the trust of the communities and to work with
existing grassroots groups of small farmers.
For example, in Senador Pompeu the program staff worked hand in hand with an
23 See Della Cava (1989) for an analysis of the role of the Catholic Church in the mobilization of the
rural poor in Brazil during the 1970s and 1980s.
active Italian priest who had been expelled from the neighboring state of Bahia by the
Church authorities for doing grassroots work. This priest facilitated the access of the
program staff to the rural communities.
The educational component of POLONORDESTE began in 1982 and included
training courses and conferences for small farmers in all of Ceard on issues related to
cooperatives. The training courses discussed basic issues concerning cooperatives:
how a cooperative works; what are the characteristics of a good co-op administration,
a good co-op manager and a good co-op President. As a small farmer who is now a
member of the COAPEC leadership said:
We started to realize that our leaders did not fit any of these characteristics. They decided
everything by themselves and we were not supposed to have any doubt about their honesty or
capacity.
Small farmers also leamed that they have important rights as co-op members, rights
that they were not fully exercising. Another small farmer of COSENA commented:
We used to wait for hours to see the manager for any problem we had. His attitude was that of
a ruler and ours of beggars. We know now that we have the right to talk to the manager at any
time, and that he is an employee of our co-op who has the obligation to help members.
The educational program turned out to be so successful in creating strong
pressures from below over entrenched leadership that most of these leadership began
to complain to OCEC. Threatened by the effects of increased participation, these
leaders wanted to terminate the agreement that OCEC had with CEPA. Because the
President of OCEC still supported the training activities, they elected a more
conservative President who opposed the courses in the next election in 1987. In the
words of the new elected President: "The educational activities were causing problems
among the membership, promoting the mobilization of a few radicals who questioned
the elected leadership." Under his leadership, OCEC rapidly retired from the
implementation of training courses, terminating the agreement with CEPA.
The mobilization of small farmers achieved its most impressive results in
COSENA and COAPEC. The educational programs helped to encourage the
formation of groups of small farmers in every village who were interested in
participating more in the local decision-making. Following OCEC's withdrawal,
CEPA did not have another implementing agency that could fulfill the same training
function as OCEC. However, officials and technical staff from CEPA saw that it was
highly probable that the small farmers would take over the leadership of COSENA and
COAPEC in the next elections of the cooperatives' authorities. They decided to hire
the social workers who had worked for OCEC in Senador Pompeu and Piquet Cameiro
and to continue the mobilization of small farmers in COSENA and COAPEC. This
decision contributed to the final takeover, which took place in 1985 in COSENA and
in 1986 in COAPEC, and led to the establishment of a more participative decision-
making process with input from the village groups. In COSENA, the change in
leadership occurred in the co-op election of 1986. While there used to be only one
candidate for President and for members of the Board of Directors, the intense work of
the social workers encouraged a group of small landowners to present another list.
The eventual winners were elected from this list. The control of these two
cooperatives by the small farmers became the basis for CEPA choosing them in 1986
as the first farmer associations to take over the newly decentralized tasks such as
credit administration and extension services.
In summary, the educational component of POLONORDESTE succeeded
because it was able to create simultaneous pressures "from above" and "from below".
over the COSENA's and COAPEC's leadership.24
Who Needs the Co-ops?
In both COSENA and COAPEC, the entrenched leadership did not struggle
strongly enough to maintain their control. My conversations with both large and small
farmers suggest that the spectacular spread of the boll weevil in the cotton crop
affected large farmers, small landowners, and sharecroppers differently. While most
of the larger farmers lost interest in the co-ops by the mid 1980s following the
spectacular spread of the boll weevil in the cotton crop, small landowners became
more interested and comprised the main portion of those who mobilized against the
previous leadership. This relates to the characteristics of the new cotton technology
promoted by the state government agencies (EPACE and EMATERCE), which the
small holders rather than the large ones found attractive. This is unusual because an
extensive literature argue that new technologies often benefit the large farmers,
increasing inequality of income and asset distribution. 5
2 Analyzing a rural food distribution program in Mexico that worked under a similar dynamics, Fox
(1992) called this phenomenon "sandwich strategy".
2 See, for example, Griffin (1974) and Pearse (1980). Other authors provide evidence contradicting
this assertion. See, for example, Gosch (1972), Hazel and Ramasamy (1991) and Lipton (1989).
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As noted in Chapter 2, cotton production fell as a result of the boll weevil,26
and all the cooperatives in Ceard faced serious financial problems. The Ceard
Agricultural Research Agency (Empresa de Pesquisa Agropecudria do Ceard, EPACE)
began promoting the use of a new technology based on an annual variety of cotton.
The new technology was capital-intensive, requiring the use of new seeds, pesticides,
and irrigation. Therefore, the larger farmers were apparently better positioned than
small farmers to adopt the new technology. However, most large farmers were
reluctant to adopt the annual cotton because it was less compatible, as I explained in a
previous chapter, with livestock production--their most important activity. The lack of
compatibility of the annual variety of cotton and the landowners' livestock production
also explains why most of them did not let their sharecroppers adopt the annual cotton,
though the high capital requirements already made it unlikely that the sharecroppers
could cultivate it on their own.
The pest affected both large and small farmers, but the large farmers had the
option of switching to livestock, as they had never abandoned it and it was still their
central product. Not producing cotton, the cooperatives became less useful to these
large farmers so they lost part of their interest in them. In contrast, the group of small
landowners became more interested in controlling the cooperatives. Without the land
required to raise livestock instead of cotton, small farmers had no other production
alternatives and, consequently, were very interested in adopting the new cotton
26 See section discussing new technologies for cotton production in chapter 3 for a complete analysis
of the effects of the boll weevil and of the suitability of perennial and annual cotton for small and large
farmers. Also see table 2.
technology being promoted by EPACE and EMATERCE. They needed to participate
more in order to have access to the new technology being promoted by the
government extension services. Control of cooperative decision-making would give
small farmers access to the credit and inputs they needed to implement this new
technology.
CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSIONS
This thesis has focused on the lessons for program design and implementation
provided by the experience of three small farmer associations in the state of Ceard,
Brazil. The evidence shows that some facts common in the literature, as well as in the
conventional wisdom among Brazilian planners, may not always be true.
The experience of Santana, the agrarian reform case, shows that a group of
landless peasants were able to succeed in raising livestock--a product they had no
previous experience with--and to leam a whole set of new technologies. This suggests
that a successful program does not necessarily have to be built upon what the
beneficiaries already know, in contrast to what most of the literature points out.
Rather than being concemed with the past experience of the beneficiaries, the
successful programs selected an activity and a technology appropriate to the
environmental and social conditions of these beneficiaries.
This study shows that COSENA and COAPEC directed high expenditures from
a federal program (PAPP) to promote a new technology for cotton (a traditional cash
crop among small farmers) inappropriate for most of their members. While the new
technology based on annual cotton may prevent the attack of the cotton disease (the
boll weevil) and increase yields, both landlords and sharecroppers (the most important
agents in Ceard's cotton production) coincide in their negative perception of the new
technology. Because annual cotton provides no feed after the harvest, landlords find
the new technology inappropriate to their livestock production. Sharecroppers not only
find it expensive, but also they face the opposition of their landlords to adopt the new
technology. Interestingly enough, small landowners were the only ones who found the
annual cotton attractive, but it was more because they lacked other alternatives rather
than for the advantages of the technology on itself.
The effects of the boll weevil and the new cotton technology explain, at least
in part, the change in leadership in COSENA and COAPEC. The evidence in this
thesis shows that the large farmers who dominated both cooperatives lost a great deal
of their interest in them as a result of the decline in cotton production due to the
attack of the boll weevil. At the same time, the small landowners--attracted by the
annual cotton--became active participants in the takeover of COSENA and COAPEC
from entrenched leadership. They needed to control the cooperatives more than ever
to get access to the inputs, technical assistance, and credit required by the annual
cotton. The decline of the cotton production also affects the sharecropping system that
has traditionally dominated in Northeast Brazil. While this is an ongoing process and
its results difficult to predict, it represents a remarkable area for further research.
It seems striking that an inappropriate technology for most of the producers
(the annual cotton) has been created and strongly promoted by state agencies. Because
the state research and extension agencies (EPACE and EMATERCE) started the
massive promotion of the annual cotton relatively recently, the state planning agency
(SEPLAN) has not yet conducted any formal evaluation. Although many
EMATERCE extension agents and supervisors think that the new cotton technology is
inappropriate, political problems that have isolated EMATERCE from SEPLAN have
simultaneously contributed to the lack of information of higher level officials in the
planning agency about these problems. All this does not necessarily imply that the
annual cotton is totally inappropriate for Ceard's conditions, but it suggests the
importance for the state agencies to know the most likely adopters of the new
technology--the small landowners--in order to better target credit and technical
assistance.
Santana's success raising dual-purpose beef and dairy livestock contradicts
most programs targeting small farmers elsewhere, which focus primarily on crops
rather than on livestock. This is not new in CearA, where the PAPP program has been
recently incorporating dairy production into some projects in the semiarid zone for
small farmer associations based on its perceived potential benefits to small farmers.
Labor-intensive livestock is also a traditional production among small farmers in other
regions (e.g. in Africa). But it is uncommon in Brazil and Latin America in general,
where peasants produce subsistence crops rather than livestock. Most importantly, the
success of Santana raising livestock would have been impossible without the collective
use of the land. Individual farmers would have failed because every farmer would
have had too little land to feed his cattle. This suggests that raising livestock may be
appropriate among small farmers even in conditions of semiarid climate and poor
soils, provided they can work out collective arrangements for the use of the land.
The evidence from Santana shows that job satisfaction on the part of the
extension agent and farmer participation in planning and monitoring the extension
services dramatically improved the performance of the extension services. This is
important because successful cases of farmer participation in planning technical
assistance are uncommon. In this case, a list of tasks that the farmers elaborated in
advance not only allowed them to define what they considered important technical
problems, but also to maximize the time that the extension agent spent in Santana.
This system allowed the extension agent to do the necessary background work for the
tasks and arrive at the fields knowing exactly what to do. Such arrangements
contributed to the extension agent's job satisfaction because he found that the settlers
were demanding and open to their advice. Most striking is that Santana worked out
these arrangements with an extension agent from EMATERCE, a state agency that has
received poor grades in evaluation reports and has been repeatedly opposing to work
under similar conditions. In part, this suggests that government extension services do
not have to be top-down to be effective, and that the solution to problems of the
extension services do not necessarily lie in privatizing the service. In fact, the
problems with the agricultural extension in Ceard and elsewhere in the Northeast may
be more related to the kind of working arrangements set up with the extension agents
than with the dichotomy of public vs. private provision.
The experiences of the associations also show that even though most of their
members are poor farmers without means to pay, they can find alternative ways of
recovering part of the costs of the extension services. COSENA, for example, charged
for gas when its extension agents provided veterinary services. Although the farmers
using veterinary services owned cattle and were the better-off of the cooperative, they
did not oppose to the fees because potential losses of not having the service (for
example, loosing a cow) were high. While the fees covered a small proportion of the
total service costs, they allowed the extension agents to purchase gas and visit small
farmers in periods of delay receiving government funds. The fees were also
distributionally desirable, as they cross-subsidized the service provided to the small
farmers.
A successful educational component of a state program has been able to avoid
the opposition of local elites by using as implementing agencies a state level
organization, OCEC, dominated by the large farmers. At the same time, the program
hired committed staff who mobilized existing grassroots groups at the local level.
While the participation of OCEC created strong pressures from above to implement
the educational tasks, the increased participation of their poor members focused
pressure from below. This turned out to be one the major reasons explaining how
small farmers in COSENA and COAPEC were able to take over coop leadership.
Introducing organizational skills among small farmers and promoting their
capacity to act collectively can have an enduring effect. The experience of the
associations in this study shows that government programs should look to building
upon active or nascent groups that already exist given the action of the Catholic
Church or other Non-Governmental Organizations, rather than merely relying on
creating new groups. When there is self-selection and the option of exit exists, these
groups may contain the best of the people.
To conclude, this thesis has provided lessons which often emerge not by the
success of a particular government program or project, but from tasks that the three
associations did well precisely outside the programs--or even against formal program
arrangements. The success stories often come from solutions that the associations
created, for example, to confront delays from government funding, to avoid formal
arrangements perceived as ineffective, or to comply with ideological and political
objectives of their membership. It is looking at these unexpected solutions that
government programs often considered as a failure may be improved to benefit the
rural poor and promote rural development.
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